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ABSTRACT 
The U. S. Marine Corps realizes its goal of being ready 
to fight in any location primarily through the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). An important component of the 
MEU's readiness is the availability of critical equipment 
repair part~ when they are needed. We test with three sets 
of past MEU data an availability based sparing model that 
builds repair parts blocks and show that the model 
outperforms the current methodology in every case. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. SUPPLY BLOCKS ........................................................................................................ 1 
A. PAST WORK ................................................................................................... 2 
B. ISSUES TO ADDRESS ................................................................................... 3 
C. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY .............................................................. .4 
II. BLOCK BUILDING PROCEDURES ........................................................................ 7 
A. ESTABLISHING THE EQUIPMENT DENSITY LIST ................................. 7 
B. DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT GENERATOR PACKAGE ........................ ~ ...... 8 . 
C. PHYSICAL BUILDING OF THE BLOCK .................................................. .11 
D. SUPPORT PROCEDURES WHILE DEPLOYED ...................................... .12 
1. I MEF Procedures ............................................................................... 12 
2. II MEF Procedures ......... : ............. : ..................................................... 12 
E. CAPTURE OF USAGE DATA .................................................................... .12 
F. RECONCILIA nON OF PROCEDURES .................. , .................................. 13 
III. MISSIONS AND MISSION PRIORITY ............................................................... 15 
A. MEU(SOC) MISSIONS ................................................................................. 15 
B. MISSION PRIORITY FACTORS ................................................................ .15 
1. Overall End Item Priority .................................................................. .16 
2. Assigning Mission-Specific Priorities to End Items .......................... 16 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES .............................................................. 19 
A. DATA REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................. 19 
1. Volume ............................................................................................... 20 
2. Demand .............................................................................................. 21 
3. Other Fields ........................................................................................ 22 
B. DATA OBTAINED FROM MARINE CORPS UNITS ............................... .23 
1. 11th MEU (I MEF) ...................................................... : ........................ 24 
2. 26th MEU (II MEF) .. ; .......................................................................... 26 
C. ASSUMPTIONS USED IN RUNNING THE MODEL ............................... .28 
V. MODEL OUTPUT ................................................................................................... 31 
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ...................................................................... 31 
B. 26TH MEU RESULTS ..................................................................................... 32 
C. 11TH MEU RESULTS ..................................................................................... 33 
D. A TEST USING LAFORTEZA'S DATA ...................................................... 33 
E. MODEL DEMONSTRATION AT THE 13TII MEU .................................... .34 
1. MSSG Needs and Constraints in Using the Model ............................ 34 
2. MSSG Impressions of Model ............................................................. 36 
F. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 37 
vii 
1. Numerical Results of the Model Tests .............................................. .37 
2. Problems Encountered With Input Data ............................................ .37 
3. Using the Model in Practice .............................................................. .38 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................ .41 
A. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 41 
B. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 42 
1. Usefulness of GenPak Data to MSSGs ............................................. .42 
2. Effectiveness of the Model in Stocking the MSSG Supply Block .... .42 
3. Use of Mission Priority Factors in Stocking the Supply Block ........ .43 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ................ : .............................................................. 43 
LIST OF REFERENCES ...........................•............................................•..................•.... 45 
APPENDIX.A. COMBAT ESSENTIALITY CODE ........................•.•...........•............. 47 
APPENDIX B. EXCERPTS FROM DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT GENERATOR 
PACKAGES/CAMP PENDLETON AND CAMP LEJEUNE ...•.............•....•...... 49 
APPENDIX C. MEU(SqC) MISSIONS .....•..............•.........•....•....•..••...................•....... 51 
APPENDIX D. INPUT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VMETRIC MODEL .....••.... 53 



























TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Activity Address Code 
Aviation Combat Element 
Administrative Delay Time, Procurement 
Amphibious Ready Group 
Battalion Landing Team 
Combat Essentiality Code 
Deployment Support Unit 
Equipment Density List 
Force Service Support Group 
Ground Combat Element 
Deployment Support Generator Package 
High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 
Loaded Unit Balance File 
Marine Air Ground Task Force 
Marine Corps Order 
Marine Expeditionary Force 
Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MEU Service Support Group 
N on-combatant Evacuation Operation 
National Stock Number 
Procurement Lead Time 
Quantity Per Assembly 
Special Operations Capable 
Source, Maintainability, and Recovery 
SASSY Management Unit 
IX 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank several individuals who contributed to this thesis. In 
particular, the Marines from Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and Okinawa who 
provided me with data and insights that were a major contribution to this thesis. Further, I 
would like to thank Mr. Jon Redfield and other individuals from Systems Exchange in 
Pacific Grove, CA for their technical guidance and personal time to assist me with 
running their programs. 
Finally, and most importantly, I wish to thank my husband David and daughter 
Meghan for their continued love, patience and support. Without them I would never have 
competed this project or my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Xl 
I. SUPPLY BLOCKS 
"As the force that must be the most ready, when the nation is least ready, the 
Marine Corps must always be prepared to fight and win our nation's battles--whenever or 
wherever they may occur [Ref. 1]." The Marine Corps realizes its goal of being ready to 
fight in any location primarily through the Marine Expeditionary Vnit (MEV). The 
Marine Corps has MEVs forward deployed at all times, ready to conduct missions 
ranging from full-fledged amphibious assaults to peacekeeping operations. 
The MEV is a task-organized unit, consisting of a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 
a MEV Service Support Group (MSSG), a composite Marine Medium Helicopter 
Squadron (which may also include some fixed-wing assets), and a MEV Command 
Element. These elements are brought together under one Commanding Officer, a concept 
known as an air/ground task force. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
concept can be used with any size unit, with the largest being the Marine Expeditionary 
Force (MEF). However, routine forward presence is maintained by the MEV, with units' 
in different parts of the world at all times. 
There are currently seven Marine Corps MEV s that routinely deploy across the 
world. They are made up of units from the first, second and third MEFs. Figure 1 shows 
the locations ofthe active MEVs. 
IMEF IIMEF IIIMEF 
Camp Pendleton, CA Camp Lejeune, NC Okinawa, Japan 
11th MEV 22nd MEV 31 st MEV 
13th MEV 24th MEV 
15th MEV 26th MEV 
FIgure 1 
The MEV deploys as part of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). In today's 
environment of military downsizing, the ARG has declined from four ships to three. 
Thus, the space allotted to the MEV for personnel, equipment, and support items for 
those assets has decreased proportionally. However, despite that decrease in space, the 
number of missions that the MEV must be prepared to conduct has increased from 18 to 
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29 [Ref. 2: p.9]. Additionally, the MEV is still required to deploy with supplies sufficient 
to sustain itself for 15 days. 
One of the primary tasks of the MSSG is to build and maintain three blocks of 
supply in order to support the MEV during its deployment. The first block, the organic 
supply block, consists of items such as cold weather clothing, tents, and individual war 
gear. The other two blocks are the Class IX consumables block and Class IX repairables 
block. The Marine Corps has all supplies divided into classes to designate types of 
supplies. Class IX refers to repair parts, with consumables being those parts that are 
thrown away after they have broken, and repairables being those that can be repaired and 
placed back into service. Both consumables and repairables support the major end items 
in the Marine Corps inventory. As with all aspects of the MEV, the space available for 
these supply blocks has decreased with the reduction of the number of ships in the ARG, 
and the MSSG has been forced to reduce the number of items carried in support of the 
MEV. For the remainder of this work, we refer to the Class IX consumables block as the 
supply block. 
Once deployed, all elements of the MEV obtain their supplies directly from the 
MSSG supply block. If the supply block does not contain the necessary item, that item 
must be ordered from the intermediate supply activity at the base from which the MEV 
deployed. Delivery of these items has costs associated with it, both in dollars and in time 
delays. Additionally, the absence of a critical repair part will decrease the readiness of 
the MEV for the length of time that it takes to receive the part. For these reasons, the 
MSSG chooses items for the supply block that maximize the readiness (support) of the 
MEV while complying with the space constraints of the ARG. 
A. PASTWORK 
Laforteza [Ref. 3] developed a model to assist the MSSG Supply Section with the 
building of the Class IX supply block prior to deployment. His model was based on the 
concept of availability based sparing, which operates within a constraint and gives an 
output of parts that produce the maximum possible achieved availability within those 
constraints. Laforteza's model used volume as the constraint rather than the more 
common dollar budget, because the limiting factor for the MEV is the amount of space 
available on the ships of the ARG. 
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The MSSG currently generates the Class IX supply block using a type of demand-
based sparing. This method does not operate under a constrained input, but generates 
expected usage based on past demand for each item. It provides a list of all parts that 
should be included in the block, but that list may exceed the space available to the 
MSSG. If it does, the MSSG Supply Section has no systematic method for deciding 
which parts to eliminate from the block. They are dependent on the experience of the 
supply and maintenance personnel who provide input on which parts are really necessary 
and which are not. 
Laforteza's model has four required inputs. First, the total available volume must 
be known, because it is the constraint under which the model runs. Next, each possible 
item the MEV can take, its past demand, and its volume must be known. The third input 
is the planning horizon for the deployment in days. Finally, Laforteza introduced the 
concept of mission priority factors. For example, each MEV mission would be given a 
priority matrix for all the end items to be used in that mission. Then, the repair parts 
associated with those end items would be given priorities in accordance with the priorities 
of the end items they support. Thus, the model would favor the repair parts associated 
with the most critical end items depending on the missions the MEV expects to conduct. 
Laforteza tested his model on the data obtained from a MEV that deployed from 
Camp Pendleton, CA in 1996 and 1997. His results showed that, if tht: MEV had used 
his model in developing its Class IX supply block, its backorders could have been 
reduced by 13 percent. This reduction could have saved approximately $11,000 in 
shipping costs, as well as saving the MSSG Supply Section many man-hours in 
developing the block [Ref. 3]. 
Laforteza's analysis has received much attention from units around the Marine 
Corps. The CG, 1st FSSG at Camp Pendleton and the Commanding Officer, 1st Supply 
Battalion indicated that they thought the model had potential use for the MEVs. 
However, despite the encouraging results of his model, Laforteza's work has not yet been 
implemented or tested further. 
B. ISSUES TO ADDRESS 
While Laforteza's work showed significant improvements over the MSSG's 
current methodology of building the supply block, it was only tested using data from one 
deployment. It does not show whether or not consistent use of the model will improve 
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the quality of the supply blocks taken on deployment. Additionally, Laforteza's model 
used the peacetime usage data of the MEF to compile its results. This is the same data 
that the MEUs currently use in creating their list of parts to take. Past research does not 
show whether the peacetime usage data is a better predictor of MEU usage than the usage 
data of the past deployments. 
Finally, Laforteza's use of mission priority factors did not significantly affect the 
make-up of the supply block created by the model. In several runs of the model using 
different priority factors, the make-up of the repair parts included in the block remained 
relatively consistent. Laforteza's mission priority factors were based on the priorities of 
the end items as a whole, and were not mission specific. They were developed 
subjectively by a Marine Officer in the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) 
headquarters. 
C. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
We make three contributions in this thesis: First, in order to confirm the validity 
of Laforteza's results, we perform additional tests of his model using data from recently 
deployed MEUs. Second, we address the issue of mission priority factors and their 
potential use in an availability based sparing model. Third, we consider whether the 
MEF usage data currently used by the MSSGs to build their supply blocks is the best 
available predictor of MEU demand, or. whether data from past deployments might be 
superior. 
Through interviews with MEU personnel and analysis of their written operating 
procedures, we outline the current procedures of the MSSG in building the supply block 
and make a comparison of these procedures across thy three Marine Corps MEFs. 
Chapter II summarizes these procedures and highlights differences throughout the Marine 
Corps. We also discuss whether or not these differences can be reconciled. 
Chapter III addresses the issue of whether specific end items can be associated 
with particular MEU missions. We also look at mission priority factors and their 
relevance to the building of the supply block. We analyze whether or not those priorities 
are valid for all MEU missions, and whether or not the MEU can effectively predict what 
missions will be conducted prior to leaving on deployment. Finally, we review Marine 
Corps orders and directives, and report results of interviews with individuals familiar 
with the issue. 
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We conduct further tests of the validity of Laforteza's model using usage data 
from units of the East and West Coasts. At the same time, we analyze whether the . 
peacetime MEF usage data is a better predictor of MEU usage than the data gathered 
from past deployments. Ch~pter IV outlines the requirements for input data in the 
model, specific methodologies used in obtaining the data, the shortfalls encountered in 
the gathering of the data, and the assumptions made in running the model. 
We summarize and interpret results of the model runs in Chapter V. Our results 
show that the model performed better than the MEU's current method for establishing its 
supply block. The model was run with no user input and was strictly based on demand 
data that was often incomplete. Improvements in the quality of the input data as well as 
some input from users with past deployment experience could enhance the model's 
capabilities. Finally, the model takes much less time to run than the current process, and 
can be manipulated easily to modify results if necessary. The model could also be run 
using different volume constraints as in the case of a MSSG suddenly taking a space 
reduction for the supply block. The users (MSSG supply personnel) were favorably 
impressed by the model's ease of use and interested in its application to making the block-
building process easier and less time consuming. 
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II. BLOCK BUILDING PROCEDURES 
The Class IX supply block is built by the MSSG Supply Section with a great deal 
of input from maintenance personnel within the MSSG. The supply section consists of 
approximately 15-20 Marines, with a Company-grade (0-1 to 0-3) Supply Officer in 
charge. This officer (and most of his Marines) will go on one or two deployments, and 
then be rotated to another job. Often, there is little to no formal turnover between the 
Supply Officers, when they change hands. Therefore, the supply section will "reinvent the 
wheel" regularly when building the block, a process that is very similar from deployment 
to deployment. 
While the procedures are generally the same across the Marine Corps, each MEF 
uses slightly different data and criteria to produce a finished product. Additionally,there 
are some differences between MSSGs of the same MEF, depending on the past 
experiences and data preferences of the supply rind maintenance personnel. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE EQUIPMENT DENSITY LIST 
The process begins by establishing the Equipment Density List (EDL), which 
contains all the major end items that the Ground Combat Element (GCE), MSSG, and 
MEU headquarters will take with them on deployment. The Aviation Combat Element 
(ACE) equipment is not included in the EDL, nor is the MSSG responsible for stocking 
Class IX repair parts for the ACE. The EDL is developed by high-level planners of the 
MEU, and takes into account the current threat situation, and the likely missions that the 
MEU will conduct. Despite that up-to-date planning, the EDL does not change 
significantly from one deployment to the next. The EDL is scheduled to be established 
approximately six months prior to the deployment, but is often not finalized until much 
later than that. For example, one recent deployment did not finalize its EDL until four and 
one-half months prior to deployment [Ref. 4]. Another Supply Officer had to proceed 
with building the block using an incomplete EDL. The remaining steps in the process 
were filled with inaccurate data and assUmptions, causing the block to be revised 
extensively later in the process [Ref.5]. 
With minor exceptions, the EDL is fairly consistent from year to year for a certain 
MEU. One common EDL difference is a result of the MEU Commanding Officer's 
decision regarding whether or not to deploy with tanks. For example, in the past, the 13th 
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MEU has usually deployed with tanks, while the other two I MEF MEU s have not. 
However, the current 11th MEU Commanding Officer changed this trend by deciding to' 
deploy with tanks [Ref. 6]. 
B. DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT GENERATOR PACKAGE 
After the EDL is complete, it is sent to the MEF intermediate supply activity 
(SMU).1 . The SMU runs a program called the Deployment Support Generator Package 
(GenPak), which uses MEF usage data, the length of support requested (either 15 or 30 
days), and the EDL quantities to create a recommended quantity for the MEU. The 
GenPak uses tw~lve months of MEF peacetime usage data to compute the recommended 
quantities. The GenPaks for the MEFs differ slightly in their appearance and in the 
calculations used for determining recommended MEU quantities, but they all use the 
same basic theory and types of data. 
The GenPak is designed to list all consumable repair parts ~sociated with the end 
items submitted by the MSSG. The output provides the Supply Officer with the total past 
year's demand for each of those repair parts, along with an average monthly recurring 
demand. The association between the end item and the repair part is managed by Marine 
Corps Logistics Base, Albany, in an Application Data Program. Because this data is not 
often updated, there are many repair parts for which no association has been made to an . 
end item [Ref. 7]. Additionally, the GenPak does not account for common items. For 
example, if a certain filter is used for both a 5-ton truck and a tank, the GenPak only takes 
into account the TOTAL demand for that filter, or the demand for both the 5-ton and the 
tank. It does not consider the fact that the MEU may be deploying with only 5-ton trucks 
and no tanks [Ref. 8]. 
The MSSG Supply Officer has some flexibility in what will be included in his 
GenPak. For example, the program uses a minimum number of hits (requisitions) as 
criteria for an item to be included in the output. That number is flexible, and is usually 
set at ten per year. If the Supply Officer wants to see a recommended MEU quantity for 
every item, regardless of the number of peacetime hits, he can request that the GenPak 
show any hits greater than zero [Ref. 8]. 
1 At II MEF, located at Camp Lejeune, NC, the intennediate supply activity is called Intennediate Supply 
Support Activity (ISSA).I MEF and III MEF call this activity the Sassy Management Unit (SMU). 
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Additionally, the MSSG Supply Officer has a choice of what Combat Essentiality 
Codes (CEC) the GenPak will include. Each end item and repair part is given a CEC, 
which is based on that item's ability to degrade the mission of the unit (a complete listing 
of CECs is at Appendix A [Ref. 3:p. 55]). For the most part, the GenPak is made up of 
CEC 5 and 6 items, which represent combat essential parts and mission essential parts. 
Additionally, some CEC 3 (safety related items) may be included if there is space 
available. Supply and maintenance personnel do not give the CEC codes. The system is 
not always accurate, and may have a critical alternator listed as a CEC 6, but have the 
bracket that is necessary to hold that alternator in place with a non-mission critical code 
assigned to it [Ref. 9]. For this reason, the GenPak is often little used and the block is 
built primarily through the past experience of the supply and maintenance personnel [Ref. 
4]. Another problem with the recominended quantities of the GenPak is that the 
peacetime usage data may differ significantly from that of the deploying units, as they are 
doing more training and exercises to ready themselves before and during deployments. 
The I MEF SMU recently hired a contractor to create a program that will 
categorize items by the priority· at which they are ordered. For example, the repair shop 
would order both the above-mentioned alternator and its corresponding bracket at a high 
priority, regardless of·the CEC assigned to each of the parts. This priority may reflect 
more accurate criticality than the assigned CEC currently reflects. A comparison of the 
existing. CEC codes and the results of their actual priority in ordering may be useful in 
determining the validity of the CEC codes. 
A final shortfall of the GenPak is that it does not accurately account for the 
difference in quantities of end items between the MEU and the entire MEF. This is an 
area in which the I MEF and II MEF GenPaks differ slightly. The II MEF version 
accounts for the size ~f the units being supported by mUltiplying the average monthly 
recurring demand quantity by one-tenth. This quantity is believed to be the average ratio 
between MEU demand and MEF demand [Ref. 10]. The II MEF GenPak also lists each 
repair part differently for every end item it supports. This allows the supply and 
maintenance personnel to analyze parts for the end items separately. 
The I MEF GenPak currently does not calculate a ratio between MEU end item 
quantities and MEF end item quantities. It provides the Supply Officer with the average 
monthly recurring demand for the MEF, and leaves it to the supply and maintenance 
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personnel to reduce that number according to their quantity of end items.2 Additionally, 
the I MEF GenPak only lists each end item one time, and multiplies the demand for that 
item by the number of end items on the EDL the item supports [Ref. 11]. Excerpts from I 
MEF and II MEF GenPaks are included at Appendix B. 
Both I MEF and II MEF use the GenPak as a starting point for building their 
supply blocks, but supply officers from both locations agree that they do not use the 
GenPak to a high degree. The majority of the parts to be included in the block are 
determined by the maintenance personnel. of the MSSG and BL T. These individuals base 
their input and changes on past experience (both garrison and deployed), using the 
GenPak primarily as a guideline for the parts to be considered. 
Units of II MEF (Camp Lejeune) add an additional step to the process. After 
maintenance personnel make recommendations to changes in the GenPak, those 
recommendations are compared to a "three-MEU usage report." This report lists an 
average MEU usage by National Stock Number (NSN). The report usually covers 12 
months, but usage data is held for a total of 27 months [Ref. 12]. However, this MEU 
usage report only captures data on items that were actually filled from the original supply 
block. It does not account for items that were backordered to the SMU. 
III MEF units (Okinawa, Japan) also begin with the running of the GenPak, but 
their procedures differ significantly after that step. The next step after the GenPak is 
produced is to compare the NSNs listed by the GenPak to an ABC Report, or Sales 
Matrix. This report evaluates the number of hits an NSN has· had over 12 months, and 
divides the NSN into three categories of A, B, and C. The "A" category is made up of 
those items with greater than 50 SMU reorders ~nnually and represents approximately 
20% of the demand. The "B" category contains those items with between 1 0 and 49 
SMU reorders per year and represents about 40% of the total demand. Finally, the "C" 
category consists of those items with less than ten SMU reorders annually. The "C" 
category items are not included in the initial block unless an exception is made for new 
parts that do not have adequate usage recorded due to time [Ref. 13]. 
2 In the past, a GenPak was used by I MEF that calculated a ratio of MEU end item quantities to MEF end 
item quantities and adjusted the recommended MEU demand quantities based on that ratio. The program 
was PC-based, developed locally at Camp Pendleton. Since the developer of that program was transferred, 
1 st Supply Battalion has been unable to continue running that program [Ref. 7]. 
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C. PHYSICAL BUILDING OF THE BLOCK 
After the GenPak has been "scrubbed" by the supply and maintenance personnel, 
it is returned to the SMD. The General Account section of the SMU issues the parts 
requested by the MEU that are on hand and orders the remaining parts requested. The 
parts are received by the MSSG and stored until the MEU deploys. 
The MSSG does not always turn in the Class IX block when it returns from 
deployment. Often, they will store the parts in their own warehouse until they determine 
what items will be needed for the next deployment. Then, they will turn in only those 
items that will not be part of the next block. However,. the SMU may require the MSSG 
to tum in some items that are needed for another MSSG that will be deploying in the near 
future, or for MEF units operating in garrison. 
Once the MSSG Supply Officer is provided with the amount of space on the ship 
allocated to the supply block, he fits the block into the appropriate number of quadcons 
and palcons.3 In general, the amount of space allotted to the Class IX block is fairly 
consistent from one MEU's deployment to the next. As one supply officer stated, 
"Everything is carried in the same number of containers every year. So I just adjust to fit 
everything in those containers [Ref. 14]." 
However, the space on board ship devoted to the Class IX block will occasionally 
be cut, and the supply officer must cut down the supply block to match the space 
available. MSSG-13 is currently preparing to deploy from Camp Pendleton, CA. The 
space available to them was cut considerably from. what they had expected. When this 
happens, the block is cut in one of two ways. Some units may simply reduce each NSN 
by the same percentage. For example, if the space available was reduced by 25%, each 
NSN quantity would be reduced by 25% as well [Ref. 3:p. 16]. However, this is not 
common practice and it does not produce good results. A more common reduction 
technique is for the Supply Section to go back to the MEU maintenance personnel and 
start over again. Each line item of the initial block is reviewed, with the least critical 
ones being removed from the block until the space constraints are met. Once again, this 
. is a very laborious process based on the experience of the personnel involved [Ref.5]. 
3 Quadcons and palcons are standard containers used by the military to store smaller items. Each has 
drawers and compartments suitable for storing a large number of items separately. 
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D. SUPPORT PROCEDURES WHILE DEPLOYED 
Once the MEU is deployed, all requisitions from the BLT, MSSG, and MEU 
headquarters are sent to the MSSG supply section. If the MSSG can fill the demand from 
the supply block, that is what is done and it is recorded as usage. If the item cannot be 
filled from the block, procedures differ for units of I MEF and II MEF: 
1. I MEF Procedures 
The deployed units of I MEF operate with all requisitions going through the 
MSSG Supply Section, whether they can be filled by the initial Class IX Supply Block or 
not. For example, if the BL T needs a filter, they prepare a requisition and submit it to the 
MSSG Supply Officer. The block is checked to determine whether the order can be 
filled. If the part is not available, the MSSG backorders the request to the Deployment 
Support Unit (DSU) of the SMU. The DSU only processes requisitions coming from the 
MSSG. If the BLT sends a request directly to the DSU, it is not processed [Ref. 5]. 
When DSU obtains the requested part, they send to the MSSG, who then transfers it to 
the BLT. 
2. II MEF"Procedures 
~he deployed units of the East Coast operate somewhat differently than those of I 
MEF. All requisitions from the BLT, MSSG, and MEU headquarters are still sent to the 
MSSG Supply Section. There, they are screened to determine whether or not that request 
can be filled from the Class IX Supply Block. If the requisition is filled, it is recorded as 
usage on the MSSG account. However, if the item requested is not available in the Class 
IX Block, the MSSG will forward the requisition to DSU under the using unit's own 
document number. 
E. CAPTURE OF USAGE DATA 
While the deployment procedures are different between the two MEFs, both 
supply systems capture usage data in the same way. Even though the I MEF MSSG is 
manqging the backorders for the BL T and MEU HQ, the usage for those backorders is 
captured under the Activity Address Code (AAC) for the supported units rather than that 
of the MSSG. For this reason, the complete usage for the MEU can only be captured by 
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pulling from the system the usage for all three AACs: the MSSG, the BLT, and the MEU 
HQ. 
F. RECONCILIATION OF PROCEDURES 
The differences in the procedures outlined above are not significant between the 
three MEFs. While each "coast" may have slightly different methods for building the 
block and different headings on its GenPak, the information they are getting to build their 
blocks is essentially the same. Both MEFs are receiving one year of MEF usage data 
that is the basis for a 30-day MEU requirement estimate. Even though the MEU s are 
only required to deploy with 15 days of sustainment per Marine Corps Order, they will 
usually err on the safe side and use a 30 day. demand. estimate when stocking their blocks 
[Ref. 11]. Neither MEF relies heavily on this data, but Supply Officers prefer to rely on 
the experience of their maintenance personnel and their own past .experience. 
While deployment procedures appear to be different in that the MSSG manages 
backorders in I MEF and the using linits manage their own backorders in II MEF, the 
usage data captured is the same. The only significant difference in the deployment 
procedures is that the MSSG in I MEF has many more requisitions to manage than that of 
II MEF. However, I MEF is co-locating the MSSG, BLT, and MEU supply sections on 
board ship now in order to better spread the workload for backorders. 
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III. MISSIONS AND MISSION PRIORITY 
Never, ever does it go how we planned [Ref. 15]. 
A. MEU(SOC) MISSIONS 
In order for a MEU to be Special Operations Capable (SOC)~ it must be proficient 
at conducting all MEU(SOC) missions. The number of MEU(SOC). missions has 
increased in the past several years from 18 to 29, although many of the 29 missions have 
some degree of overlap. These missions vary in scope from a full-scale amphibious 
assault to peacekeeping operations. A complete list of MEU(SOC) missions is at 
Appendix C [Ref. 2:p. 9]. 
Prior to the establishment of the EDL, the MEU(SOC) commander and his staff 
analyze the upcoming deployment, both for scheduled operations as well as possible 
additional missions. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.9A, Policy for Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), provides the commander with a basic 
equipment loadout. The commander may adjust this loadout based on his estimate of the 
situation [Ref. 2:p. 14]. 
The MEU(SOC) commander, however, must be careful to not degrade his 
command's ability to conduct all MEU(SOC) missions. As stated by Marine Corps 
Order, 
The MEU(SOC) is organized, trained, and equipped as a self-
sustaining, general-purpose expeditionary force that possesses the 
capability to conduct a wide spectrum of con~entional and selected 
maritime special operations, rather than a force which is tailored for a 
specific operation or area of responsibility [Ref. 2:p. 9]. 
B. MISSION PRIORITY FACTORS 
There are two types of mission priority factors that we considered for 
implementation in determining the best supply block for the MEU. The first looks at 
assigning each end item an overall priority for the deployment, without taking into 
account specific missions and that item's role in those missions. Repair parts would then 
be prioritized according to the priority of the end item they supported. 
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The second method is to prioritize individual end items for each specific mission. 
Then, repair parts would be prioritized based on the relative probability of conducting 
certain missions and their associated end items' priorities for those missions. 
1. Overall End Item Priority 
In his thesis, Laforteza assigned each end item a priority from A to D, based on 
the input of a staff officer in the 1st Force Service Support Group Plans section. The 
priorities were based on a generic MEU(SOC) mission. When the priorities of th~ end. 
items were transferred to their respective repair parts, the repair part was given the same 
priority as the highest end item it supported. This resulted in 80% of the repair parts 
being given a mission priority of A [Ref. 3:p: 32]. 
Despite the large percentage of priority A repair parts, the overall end item 
priority method has credibility. One officer we interviewed conducts the certification 
training for MEU(SOC)s prior to their deployment. He stated that you can identify the 
MEU(SOC) unit's prioritized equipment by looking at the end items that are pre-loaded 
on the landing craft aboard the ships. Generally, these items include light armored 
vehicles, tanks, HMMWVs (high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle) that contain heavy 
machine guns and other weapons systems, and some trailers for storage of additional 
equipment [Ref. 6]. However, the same officer indicated that it is difficult to give a lower 
priority to any end item in today's MEU(SOC) because the shift from four to three ships 
in the ARG has greatly reduced the total number of end items taken. 
When Laforteza used these priority factors in the running of his model, they did 
not affect the repair parts the model recommended for the supply block. Because so 
many of the repair parts had a priority of A, the differentiation bet.ween the priority 
factors was negligible. 
2. Assigning Mission-Specific Priorities to End Items 
The second alternative in assigning priorities to end items is to give each a 
different priority for every potential MEU(SOC) mission. The difficulty in this method is 
the variability in missions. Two executions of the same general mission type may look 
completely different and use different numbers and types of end items. To generalize and 
say that a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) mission will always use certain 
end items is nearly impossible because the NEO parameters change based on political, 
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geographical, and other factors. For example, the 1990 NEO in Liberia, Africa was of a 
very small scale with very little equipment involved. However, a variety of planning· 
scenarios' had been developed for that same NEO with wide ranges of end items being 
used. The decision on what equipment would actually be used was not made until just 
prior to execution of the operation [Ref. 16]. 
The timing of an unexpected mission can also greatly affect the end items used. 
For example, an operation could occur during or just after a planned exercise. Equipment 
may be loaded on the ships differently than the initial load-plan and some end items may 
not be available for use simply due to their location on ship [Ref. 6]. 
Another ,factor in assigning mission priorities is the subjectivity of such an 
assignment. A commander's past experience and his familiarity with the capabilities of 
certain end items will likely sway his preferences of which end items to use in an 
operation. 
Finally, as the opening quote suggests, it is difficult for th~ MEU(SOC)s to plan 
long-term with enough certainty to base sparing levels on that planning. Even if a MEU 
is certain to be conducting a large-scale humanitarian assistance mission, most 
commanders would resist degrading the capability of their combat equipment in order to 
better support the generators and 5-ton trucks associated with that mission. 
For all of these reasons, we chose not to include any type of mission priority 
factors in our validation of Laforteza's model for this work. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES 
Laforteza's work stated that an availability based sparing model could be used by 
the MEU(SOC) to create a supply block that reduced backorders during the deployment. 
Additionally, he stated that labor-hours and shipping costs could be reduced. We test the 
validity of Laforteza's model in two ways: (1) conducting backtests of recently deployed 
units to validate the positive results of Laforteza's test and (2) taking the model to a unit 
preparing for deployment to analyze the model from a user's perspective. 
A. DATA REQUIREMENTS 
While' Laforteza's work used an availability based sparing model developed 
specifically for his use, commercially available products have been developed to serve a 
similar purpose. For our validation, we used the commercial product VMETRIC, a multi-
echelon, multi-indenture stock optimizing model produced by Systems Exchange in 
Pacific Grove, CA.4 VMETRIC is designed to perform two primary tasks: (1) For a 
specified availability or fill rate, VMETRIC finds the least costly mix and geographic 
distribution of stock and (2) Within a specified budget constraint, VMETRIC finds the mix 
and geographic distribution of stock that maximizes the availability and fill rates [Ref. 
17:p.2]. 
VMETRIC was primarily designed to provide optimal spare parts levels for one 
system at a time. F or example, it might optimize all the parts necessary to maximize a 
747 jet airplane's operational availability within a certain cost constraint. Factors such as 
reparability of the item, level of repair required for each item, delay times associated with 
both procurement and repair, whether or not there will be lateral resupply between 
operating sites, and the desirability of cannibalization of equipment all may be taken into 
account in the VMETRIC model. 
4 Multi-echelon refers to the program's ability to allow maintenance to occur on items at different 
levels, which are generally organizational, intermediate, and depot. Multi-indenture means that parts have 
, 
different hierarchy in the composition of the system. For example, a belt that is part of an alternator would 
be of a lower indenture than the alternator itself. 
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The MEU(SOC) problem is different from the problem VMETRIC is designed to 
solve. We are asking the program to optimize spare parts across many systems of 
different 'types rather than optimizing a mix of spares associated with one end item. For 
our purposes, the MEU was ~onsidered a single end item, with all the repair parts in 
support of it. Rather than stocking to some availability level, we use the model simply to 
maximize fill rate from the block given space constraints. 
The Marine Corps does not keep detailed indenture data for repair parts, so we 
gave every repair part an indenture code of one in VMETRIC. This means that, although a 
tire will go directly on a truck and a screw may be used on an alternator which would 
then be used on the truck, both the tire and the screw are given the same indenture (or 
relationship) to that truck. 
VMETRIC is designed to accept thirty-six input values, which are listed in 
Appendix D [Ref. 17]. Many of these values are not relevant for the MEV problem. For 
example, because we studied the consumable supply block, we did not use repair cycle 
time data or repair in place rate. We considered the MEU one site, which eliminated the 
need for lateral resupply data between sites. For the purposes of this study, we 
concentrated on obtaining the following information to run V -Metric: 
1. Volume 
The volume of the item was used in lieu of the item price input and a "shadow 
price" was constructed for the cost constraint in building the block. VMETRIC allows the 
user to give weights to the price, volume, and weight of the items in order to calculate a 
shadow price. Because volume is the primary constraint for MEU(SOC) units, we 
assigned a weight of one to volume, and a weight of zero to pri,ce and weight. Thus, the 
model only considered volume when it stocked the repair parts. 
Each item entered in the model must be given a positive volume. The program is 
only designed to take input values to two decimal places (11100 fe). Because many of the 
items comprising the supply block are small, such as nuts, screws, and bolts, they had 
volumes considerably less than 0.01 cubic feet. However, a volume of 0.00 was not 
acceptable to the program, so those items' volumes were rounded up to 0.01 cubic feet for 
the purpose of this study. 
Additionally, volumes of many items were not available. Laforteza's work 
identified 4,910 items for which he assumed a volume of .01 cubic feet. This value was 
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the median of the known volumes of the NSNs in his study (a total of 19,100 NSNs) [Ref. 
3 :p. 31]. We conducted further research to find the unknown volumes during the course 
of our study. Storage personnel at I MEF maintain a database of volumes that they 
obtained by using a machine called the Cubiscan. However, this database only produced 
66 of the unknown volumes. The Defense Logistics Services Center compiles a CD-
ROM series called FedLog that includes pertinent information about individual NSNs, 
but does not include volume measurements [Ref. 18]. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
study, we continued Laforteza's assumption that the missing volumes were equal to 0.01 
cubic feet. 
We do not believe either of these assumptions will affect the results of the model 
tests, because the same assumed volumes were used for computing both the space 
actually used by the MEU and the space given to the model as a constraint. For example, 
when we were given a list of the items taken by the MEU on deployment, we calculated 
the total space those items used on board ship. Then, we used that total space as a 
constraint within which the model must stock its parts. Because we used the assumed 
volumes in both the calculation of the total space and in the running of the model, the 
assumptions favor neither one. 
Of course, the assumptions could be meaningful when actually building a block, 
depending on how much the true size of the items differs from the a~sumed volume. 
Most of the items in the consumables supply block are very small, with only 6% of the 
items with known volume having a volume of greater than 1.0 cubic feet. However, these 
items account for over 80% of the total volume of the block. Therefore, the assumption 
of .01 cubic feet for large items could greatly un,derestimate the actual total size of the 
block. 
2. Demand 
The demand field in VMETRIC requires the number of demands per million 
operating hours of equipment. There are two problems associated with this field. First, 
the repair parts the MEU uses often support several end items, which may have different 
levels of operating hours. The supply system keeps a total demand figure for all the 
repair parts, but does not break down that demand among the end items the part supports. 
Therefore, we cannot know how many operating hours are represented by the demand 
figure given by the GenPak. 
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Second, the Marine Corps supply system does not maintain demand data per 
operating hours of equipment. Instead, it records demand over a certain period of time, 
regardless of use of equipment. The GenPak uses annual demand figures to provide the 
MSSG with an expected demand for a part for 30 days. Those calculations are performed 
in a slightly different manner for I MEF and II MEF, but each MEF's GenPak has a 
column representing the estimated MEV demand for one month. A more complete 
discussion of existing Marine Corps data and its applicability to availability based 
sparing can be found in Penrose [Ref. 19]. 
For this field, therefore, we began with the GenPak recommended quantity for 
monthly MEV usage. However, because VMETRIC is looking for data per million 
operating hours, we converted the GenPak's Il?-onthly demand prediction using a worst-
case figure of 168 hours/week, or 24 hours/day usage on equipment. We multiplied the 
GenPak recommended.MEV stockage quantity by 1488 hours to represent a total of one 
million hours of usage. 
3. Other Fields 
The NSN and part name identify the part. All parts we considered for stockage in 
the supply block were required to have a unique' NSN. If available, the part name was 
included for easy identification. 
Quantity per assembly (QPA) is a.required field for running VMETRIC. We used a 
QPA of one for every NSN, which means that the entire MEV is treated as one end item, 
with all the repair parts as second indenture level items beneath it. 
We used the on-hand quantity for the General Account (representing the SMU's 
on-hand quantities) as the maximum stock field. We ass1pIled that the SMU could not 
provide the MEV(SOC) with a greater quantity than they currently had on hand. 
Currently, if the MSSG wants more than the SMU's on-hand quantity, they submit a 
backorder for that part and it is shipped to them when it comes in. However, they often 
do not receive the part prior to their departure and the backorder remains with them while 
on deployment. Because those items would not be included in the initial supply block, 
we did not include them in our model's options for building an initial supply block. 
We took the procurement lead time (PL T) and administrative delay time, 
procurement (ADTP) from the data of II MEF. Based on the experience of the 26th MEV, 
we assigned a PLT of 38 days and an ADTP of 7 days. To ensure that this estimation 
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would not affect the model results, we ~so ran the model with a worst-case combined 
PL T and ADTP of 180 days. The results did not differ significantly from those we 
observed with the total delay of 45 days. We believe that the change from 45 days to 180 
days did not affect the outcome of the model because the same delay time was used for 
every item, making it impossible for the model to distinguish between items based on 
delay time. 
Finally, we assigned the Source, Maintainability, and Recovery (SMR) code of 
P AOOZ for all consumable parts. This code can be broken down into the following: 
o P A: The item is procured and stocked for anticipated or known usage. 
o 0: The support item is removed, replaced, and used at the organizational level 
of maintenance . 
o 0: The lowest maintenance level capable of complete repair ofthe support 
item is the organizational level. 
o Z: Non reparable item. When unserviceable, condemn and dispose at the 
level indicated. [Ref.·20] 
B. DATA OBTAINED FROM MARINE CORPS UNITS 
Data for our analysis was obtained from the two most recently completed 
deployments, 11 th MEU from I MEF and 26th MEU from II MEF. These units had the . 
most complete and recent data available to us and were not deployed at the time of the 
study. Because the MEUs do not routinely keep the data we were seeking, the MEUs that 
had deployed earlier did not have that data. 
We gathered four items of data: The first item, the Loaded Unit Balance File 
(LUBF), is a list of what the MEU took with them when they left on deployment. This 
data is necessary for computing the total volume that the MEU used for its supply block 
and for comparison purposes after running the model. The second data requirement is the 
GenPak based on the MEV's EDL. This represents the usage data for the entire MEF 
over a 12-month period, with a recommended MEU usage quantity. The GenPak also 
provided us with the Combat Essentiality Codes, the Maximum Stock Levels, and the 
NSNs and nomenclatures of the items. Third, we obtained the usage data from past 
MEU(SOC) deployments. We used this data for alternative usage quantities to compare 
the effectiveness of past MEU data and peacetime MEF data in predicting the usage of an 
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upcoming deployment. Finally, the actual usage for the unit being studied was necessary 
to judge the success of the model as compared to the LVBF. 
1. 11th MEV (I MEF) 
The 11th MEV did not keep a copy of their pre-deployment LVBF. The LVBF is 
updated every week and units are not required to hold previous copies of the LVBF once 
they receive a more recent copy. We interviewed several MSSG Supply Officers from I 
MEF, but none of them had been given an example of a pre-deployment L VBF when they 
replaced the outgoing Supply Officer. 
There are no specific criteria given to MSSG Supply Officers constraining the 
number ofNSNs in their supply block. The I MEF Supply Blocks are generally between 
3,000 and 5,000 NSNs. However, the SMV does not allow the MEV to take any item for 
which the MEF does not have a requisitioning objective. The philosophy is that if the 
MEF has not had enough usage on a part to justify a requisitioning objective, then the 
MEV should not be expecting to record usage on that part. Secondly, the SMU 
discourages the MEV from stocking a greater quantity of an NSN than the recorded usage 
of the MEF for a similar period oftime [Ref. 21]. 
For this study, we obtained a LVBF from 11th MEV that represented the NSNs 
that the MEV had on hand when they returned from deployment vice those they took with 
them when they left. The difference in the LVBFs is primarily in NSNs that were 
depleted and not replenished through reorder points near the end of the deployment cycle, 
because the MEV will no longer be replenished automatically after a certain point in time 
[Ref. 22]. 
Additionally, when the MEV returned, it was required to turn in approximately 
300 NSNs to the SMU to be issued to other units that needed the parts prior to 11th MEV's 
next deployment [Ref. 22]. The MEV had taken out approximately 5,000 NSNs when it 
left on deployment, and the most complete LVBF we could obtain had 4,483 of those 
NSNs remaining on it. 
We expect these differences to affect the results in favor of our model, because the 
NSNs returned to the SMV are high demand items that the SMU did not have on hand to 
issue to units that needed them. The 11 th MEV LVBF we used for this study will 
understate the NSNs and quantities that the MEV had on hand for these important items, 
24 
as well as those items that the MEU depleted during the deployment and did not 
replenish. 
We ran the model on this data despite these problems, knowing that the only 
conclusive result would be one in which the LUBF performed better than the model with 
such a great handicap. 
The GenPak we received from the SMU Operations Section was based on today's 
usage data vice that of the time that 11 th MEU was preparing to deploy. The past MEF 
usage data is no longer available because each quarter the oldest quarter usage is purged 
as the most recent data is saved. We do not believe the use of today's usage data 
significantly affects the results of our backtest, because the data still represents a full year 
of usage, with all seasons represented. . The type of equipment has not changed 
significantly from the time of the 11 th MEU deployment to the present. The GenPak 
provided all usage for any CEC 5 or' 6 repair part associated with the end items that 11 th 
MEU took with them. The GenPak included any item that had greater than zero hits for 
the past year (i.e., registered any demand in the past year). The SMU provided a GenPak 
that contained 5,684 unique NSNs. 
We were unable to obtain past MEU(SOC) usage data from I MEF. We were 
given 27 months of usage data that we were told represented total MEU usage, but later 
found out that it only represented the usage of the MSSG and the BL T and MEU 
Headquarters items that were filled directly from the supply block. It did not include any 
items for the BL T and MEU Headquarters that were backordered to the SMU [Ref. 7]. 
Therefore, we did .not compare MEF usage data and past MEU usage data for I MEF 
units. 
We obtained 11th MEU usage data from two sources at I MEF. The first set was 
from the Maintenance Records at I MEF. The maintenance data should parallel the 
supply data because the two systems interact. However, sometimes records are not 
reconciled properly and the information will not pass from one system to the next [Ref. 
7]. This set of 11 th MEU usage data consisted of 570 NSNs, of which 363 were CEC 5 
or 6 items. 
To verify the Maintenance Records data, we also pulled 11 th MEU usage data 
from the SMU through the supply records. This set of data was drastically different than 
the data from the maintenance records. In the supply usage data, there were a total of 
2,181 NSNs, of which 966 were known to be CEC 5 and 6. See Penrose [Ref. 19] for a 
discussion of this type of discrepancy. 
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For our study, we used the supply data, because the number ofNSNs was more in 
accordance with what we expected a MEU to use on deployment. 
2. 26th MEV (II MEF) 
The Supply Officer from the 26th MEU provided a copy of the pre-deployment 
LUBF, which consisted of2,172 NSNs, of which 943 were classified CEC 5 or 6. This is 
less than half of the number of NSN s taken by 11 th MEU, but the total volume of the two 
supply blocks is nearly equal. 
As with'I MEF, the Supply Officers of II MEF are not limited to a certain number 
ofNSNs for their supply blocks. However, the II MEF SMU encourages the MEU to aim 
for deploying with the smallest number ofNSNs possible. The MSSG 26 Supply Officer 
stated that, while he was building his supply block, the SMU OIC told him that he should 
strive to create a block smaller than the one that was deployed at the time [Ref. 23]. II 
MEF has this policy to minimize the "comfort factor," or unnecessary parts, that the 
MSSG takes with them on deployment [Ref. 25]. 
The GenPak for the 26th MEU EDL contained all CEC 5 and 6 items with greater 
than zero hits for the previous year. It was also based on current usage data vice the 
usage at the time of the ·26th MEV's deployment. The total number of unique NSNs 
included on this GenPak was 1,062. 
The II MEF GenPak had less than one-fifth the number ofNSNs provided by the I 
MEF GenPak, despite being based on similar equipment density lists. The primary 
reason for the difference is the way the GenPak programs are written. The II MEF 
GenPak reduces the monthly MEF demand by one-tenth in order to account for the 
smaller size of the MEU as compared to the entire MEF. When that calculation is done, 
the program rounds the fractions and rejects all recommended MEU stockage quantities 
less than one [Ref. 24]. The II MEF SMU eliminates these NSNs completely from the 
GenPak report to discourage the MEU from stocking more NSN s. 
The II MEF SMU Operations section cQllects the same usage data as the units of I 
MEF. They do not compile total MEU(SOC) usage, but keep records of the MSSG usage 
and that of items taken from the supply block. We were unable to get total usage from 
past MEU(SOC) units. 
We did find a database compiled by a staff officer of the 2nd FSSG containing all 
CEC 5 and 6 items from the past six MEU(SOC) deployments that had an average of four 
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or more hits over the seven months prior to deployment and the six-month deployment (a 
total of 13 months) [Ref. 25]. The usage data for this database was obtained through the 
maintenance system vice the supply system. We obtained a copy of that database, which 
had a total of 751 unique NSNs, for use in comparing past MEU usage data to MEF 
usage data. 
The II MEF SMU Operations section compiled the actual usage data from the 26th 
MEU by compiling the three Activity Address Codes of the BLT, the MEU Headquarters, 
and the MSSG and consolidating the results. There were a total of 7,969 unique NSNs 
used by the 26th MEU, with 2,401 of them categorized as CEC 5 and 6. This number is 
much higher than we expected and does not match the MSSG 26 Supply Officer's 
estimation of the number ofNSNs used. 
We suspect that the data may contain usage from a longer period of time than the 
MEV's six-month dep~oyment. For example, the usage may represent an entire year's 
data rather than a six month period. This would cause the number of backorders shown 
by both the model and the LUBF to be overstated. 
While this misrepresentation will not affect the total backorders in favor of either 
the model or the LUBF, it will have an impact on the percentage difference in backorders 
for whichever method performs better. Figure "2 shows .this effect with a hypothetical 
example. While the number of backorders increases by the same amount with the greater 
usage, the percentage change in backorders is smaller when the demand is greater. 
Therefore, if the usage data we received is greater than the actual usage recorded by the' 
26th MEU, the percentage difference between the model and the LUBF quantities will be 
understated. 
LUBF MODEL PERCENT DIFF 
On Hand Quantity 100 50 
Backorders with 50 100 50% 
Usage of 150 
Backorders with 1400 1450 3% 
Usage of 1500 
FIgure 2 
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c. ASSUMPTIONS USED IN RUNNING THE MODEL 
We made the following assumptions when running the model: 
1. All unknown volumes were assumed to be .01, based on Laforteza's 
research. As discussed previously, this assumption affects the performance of the LVBF 
and the model stockage quantities in the same way. 
2. We ran the model using CEC 5 and 6 items, and assumed that success or 
failure with these items translated to success or failure on a larger scale with all CEC 
items. 
CEC 5 and 6 items are those most critical to mission accomplishment. The 
success of the model in building a supply block that performs better than the current 
methods with these items alone would be a benefit to the MSSG Supply Officer. 
However, stockage of the lower CECrepair parts is accomplished in the same way as that 
of CEC 5 and 6. The GenPak can be produced for all CEC items for input into the model. 
Therefore, the model should work in the same manner for lower CEC items as it does for 
CEC 5 and 6. 
If the model were used in this manner, it could be done in one of three ways. 
First, if the model is run for all CEC items, a higher criticality should be given to the 
CEC 5 and 6 items because their availability can cause a greater impact to the readiness 
of the MEV. Second, the volume constraint for the model can be divided into two parts, 
one for CEC 5 and 6 items and a second one for all other CECs. Then, the model could 
be run separately for each category and the results consolidated for the entire block. 
Third, the model could simply be run for all CECs, with the total volume of the LVBF 
used as the model's volume constraint. 
3. To measure the success of the model, we compared total usage to total on-
hand quantities of both the LVBF and the model recommended stockage levels. This 
assumes that there are no reorder points and that the on-hand stocks are not automatically 
replenished during the deployment due to reaching reorder points vice actual usage. 
In practice, the MEV does establish reorder points and on-hand stocks are 
automatically replenished throughout the deployment. The MEV stocks its initial on-
hand quantities based on a projected 30-day usage, and sets requisitioning objectives and 
reorder points based on a percentage of that stock level. The initial stocks may vary 
based on the MEVs known schedule of operations. For example, if the MSSG Supply 
Officer knows that the MEV will be doing a large operation during the early part of the 
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deployment, he may stock more batteries than the 30-day usage recommends. This is 
because he knows a large number of batteries will be used on the exercise, without time 
for replenishment to take effect. 
The model and the LUBF initial quantities are both based on a 30-day projected 
demand. Our assumption of no replenishment and consequent measurement of success 
will overstate backorders for both the LUBF and the model stockage levels. Both would 
be receiving replenishments that would reduce the number of backorders over the course 
of the deployment. Therefore, we do not believe it will have an impact favoring either 
the model or the current method. 
4. Personnel from the SMU Operations sections of both I MEF and II MEF 
stated that when the GenPak recommends MEU stockage levels for an item that supports 
numerous types of end items, it multiplies the expected demand for that item by the 
number of types of end items the part supports. For example, if the GenPak encounters a 
tire that has an expected MEU monthly usage of 10, but that tire is used on three types of 
end items that the MEU is taking on deployment, it will recommend a MEU stockage 
quantity of30. 
As discussed previously, the expected usage of 10 was initially based on the total 
usage of that tire,· and did not break its usage down by individual end item types. 
Therefore, the total expected usage is actually 10 across all types of end items that part 
supports. The GenPak's multiplication of this usage overstates the demand for parts that 
support multiple items. 
The I MEF and II MEF GenPaks calculate expected MEU usage quantities for the 
parts that support multiple types of end items in a similar manner, but they are presented 
differently on the report. The I MEF GenPak program multiplies the demand by the 
number of types of end items internally, and the report lists each part once with that 
adjusted usage quantity [Ref. 11]. The II MEF GenPak lists the part separately for each 
end item that part supports, and it is up to the personnel using the report to add the 
expected MEV usage quantities for that part to determine its total stockage [Ref. 12]. 
The personnel at both SMUs are aware of this problem with the GenPak output, but do 
not currently have a solution for it [Refs. 11,12]. 
We use the GenPak's method of calculating expected MEV demand because there 
is not currently a way in the supply system to break down usage into quantities per type 
of end item. Therefore, the overstated demand for the parts that support multiple end 
items will cause the model to stock more of those items than it would otherwise. 
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However, the model is still working with the same data that is available to the MSSG 
Supply Officer when he builds the supply block. Therefore, we do not believe this 
assumption affects the outcome of the test. 
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v. MODEL OUTPUT 
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
We ran the model on four sets of data: 26th MEU GenPak data, 11 th MEU GenPak 
data, 11th MEU GenPak data from Laforteza's thesis, and 26th MEU using the past MEU 
usage database. 
The model stocked a large percentage of its available NSNs each time it was run, 
concentrating more on breadth ofNSN (taking a larger number of total NSNs) vice depth 
(taking larger quantities of each NSN, but fewer NSNs). As expected, it was inclined to 
stock fewer large-volume items, and often did not stock any of the items that were 
inordinately large. 
We gave the model a volume constraint based on the volume of the CEC 5 and 6 
items on the unit's deploying LUBF. We considered only CEC 5 and 6 items for these 
tests to limit the number ofNSNs, with the exception of the retest of Laforteza's data that 
contained all CECs. 
Success of the model stockage levels and the LUBF . quantities was measured by 
comparing total backorders for each of the methods. A backorder was calculated by 
comparing the number total demands for an item to the number stocked. For example, if 
there were ten demands for a filter and the model stocked two, eight backorders would 
result. When the LUBF or the model quantity was greater than the quantity actually used, 
the backorders would be zero. There was no penalty for overstocked items. 
This measurement of success is not completely accurate, because the data we had 
did not include the timing of the demands. The LUBF may have had replenishment of its 
stock and had sufficient quantities to cover the usage. However, backorder comparison is 
the most logical measure of success for the data we had and does provide a measurement 
common to both the model and the LUBF stockage levels. 
The VMETRIC model was very simple to use. It was run using a 133 MHz 
Pentium laptop computer and the run time was between fifteen minutes and eight hours, 
depending on the number of NSNs the computer was processing. We used a MS-DOS 
version of the program, and files were converted from a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet into 
a comma-separated file for import into the program. 
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B. 26TH MEU RESULTS 
The total volume on the 26th MEU LUBF was 15,201 cubic feet, of which 14,386 
was for CEC 5 and 6 items. 943 of the 2,172 total NSNs were CEC 5 and 6. The 
GenPak listed 1,065 NSNs having II MEF usage, which we used as the model's input 
from which to choose the final stockage quantities. The demand rate was the sum of the 
GenPak's recommended quantity for each NSN, multiplied by 1,488 to represent 
approximately one million hours of usage. For example, if a specific NSN was listed six 
times with a recommended quantity of one for each time, the demand for that NSN was 
six multiplied by 1488, or 8,928. 
The model stocked 897 of the 1,065 NSNs it was given to choose from, and used 
a total volume of 13,442 cubic feet. However, the model's summary report showed that 
the model was actually using all 14,386 cubic feet within its constraint. We were unable 
to resolve these volume differences in the program at the time this thesis was completed. 
Figure 3 summarizes the results of the test for the 26th MEV. It shows that the model 
performed significantly better than the MEU's LUBF despite using a smaller volume. 
The model resulted in a total of 52,596 backorders while the LUBF resulted in 68,416 
backorders. This data suggests that the MEU could have reduced its backorders by 23% 
if it had used an availability based sparing model to stock its block. Additionally, as 
discussed in Chapter IV, the percentage reduction may be understated due to the 
unusually high usage data we received from II MEF. 
26 MEU RESULTS MEULUBF MODEL RESULT 
Total Volume (CEC 5/6) 14386 fe 13442 fe 
Number ofNSNs stocked 943 897 
Total Backorders 68416 52956 
FIgure 3. 
We ran the model a second time using the usage data from six past MEUs. This 
data represented the CEC 5 and 6 items that had an average MEU usage of over four hits 
during a 13-month period. Although the MEU only uses the supply block during the six 
month deployment, this data was collected from the usage of all MEU components during 
the pre-deployment training. The list included 751 NSNs. The model stocked 749 ofthe 
751 items available to it, and used a total volume of 14,415 cubic feet (working with a 
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constraint of 14,386 cubic feet). Despite the smaller number of NSNs stocked by the 
model, it still performed better than the LUBF, with 63,695 total backorders compared to 
68,416 for the LUBF. This 7% reduction in backorders is also understated due to the 
unusually high usage data we received from II MEF. The improvements may have been 
even more significant if the past MEU usage data had included NSNs with one or more 
hits, vice just those with four or more hits. This would have allowed the model to stock 
more NSNs and most likely meet more of the usage demands. 
C. 11 TH MEU RESULTS 
The total volume on the 11th MEU LUBF was 14,164 cubic feet, of which 13,320 
was for CEC 5 and 6 items. 2,408 of the 4,483 total NSNs were CEC 5 and 6. The 
GenPak listed 5,684 NSNs having I MEF usage, which we used as the model's input from 
which to choose the final stockage quantities. The demand rate was the GenPak's 
recommended quantity for each NSN multiplied by 1,488 to represent the demand per 
one million operating hours. The model stocked 5,067 of the available 5,683 NSNs. 
However, it only used 11,661 cubic feet of its constraint of 13,320. Once again, the 
model performed better than the MSSG LUBF in the total number of backorders when 
compared to the actual 11th MEU usage. In this case, the LUBF quantities resulted in 
15,090 backorders, while the model recommended stockage levels had just 6,992. The 
model could have reduced backorders by over 50%. However, as mentioned previously, 
the LUBF used for this comparison does not represent the actUal on-hand' quantities that 
the 11 th MEV had with them when they deployed. We expect that the number of 
backorders for the LVBF quantities would have. been reduced if we had been able to 
obtain an accurate pre-deployment LUBF. Therefore, we make only the very weak 
conclusion that the LVBF was not better than the model when given a large handicap. 
D. A TEST USINGLAFORTEZA'S DATA 
We conducted a retest of the data presented in Laforteza's work. While the model 
used for this work is a similar concept to the one developed by Laforteza, there is a slight 
difference in the input parameters. F or example, Laforteza used an essentiality factor in 
his test, which we chose not to do. He also tested his model using all CECs rather than 
just the CEC 5 and 6 NSNs with which we had previously been working. We retested 
Laforteza's data to determine whether these differences would affect the results. 
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Laforteza's work centered around the 11th MEV from I MEF, but used data from 
the deployment prior to the one we have already studied. The LVBF used 15,370 cubic 
feet of space, and the GenPak provided 19,100 NSNs from which to choose stockage 
levels. Laforteza calculated a monthly demand rate that we used in the model as demand, 
but we multiplied it by 1,488 to represent demand per one million operating hours. 
Our model run stocked 18,609 items of a possible 19,100 provided by the 
GenPak, and slightly overshot its volume constraint by using 15,374 cubic feet. The 
demand for the 11th MEV was comprised of 1,100 NSNs. The 11th MEV LVBF 
quantities would have resulted in 4,730 backorders, while the VMETRIC model results 
had 1,090 backorders, a reduction of 3,640. Laforteza stated that his model could have 
reduced backorders by 13% [Ref. 3]. Our resll:lts show even greater reductions, with over 
a 75% reduction in backorders. Although both models resulted in improvements over the 
current method of buqding the block, we were unable to reconcile the large differences 
between them. 
E. MODEL DEMONSTRATION AT THE 13TH MEU 
Another aspect of the validity of an availability based sparing model is its ease of 
use from the user's point of view. In order to evaluate the model's applicability to the 
block-building process, we took a copy of the VMETRIC program to Camp Pendleton, 
CA, for a demonstration with the Supply , Officer ofMSSG-13, which was soon to deploy. 
The MSSG-13 had recently completed the block-building process. 
Data was gathered from the 13th MEV in order to make the demonstration more 
relevant to them. We obtained a GenPak designed from the 13 MEV's equipment list and 
a newly-completed LVBF for use in calculating the total yolume available for stocking. 
We ran the model for the MSSG, and allowed the Supply Officer to adjust the initial 
stock levels to meet her needs. Adjustment of the initial stock levels in VMETRIC is the 
equivalent of setting minimum levels for the model to stock. 
1. MSSG Needs and Constraints in Using the Model 
The current system for building the supply block does not leave the Supply 
Officer much confidence in the NSNs and quantities chosen for the LVBF. the Supply 
Officer is often forced to take the recommendations of the maintenance personnel 
because the GenPak is insufficient to meet his needs. However, the MSSG 13 Supply 
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Officer commented that maintenance personnel "ask for the world and see what they can 
get [Ref. 26]." Although the 13th MEU was scheduled to deploy in less than two weeks at 
the time of the demonstration, the Supply Officer seemed still to be looking at our model 
output for answers as to what quantities should have been stocked. We believe that this is 
due to the lack of quality data she is provided to assist her in building her supply block, as 
well as the subjective manner in which the block is developed. 
One requirement stated by the Supply Officer was that the model must provide 
output that is easy for the supply and maintenance personnel to understand [Ref. 26]. She 
stated that Maintenance personnel often toss the GenPak to the side because they do not 
understand the headings on the columns and do not generally trust reports coming from 
computers. This is not surprising because, as previously discussed, the GenPak does not 
include many mission essential items if they are not categorized with the proper CEC 
code. The GenPak also misses parts that are not given an association to a particular end 
item. 
Additionally, the Supply Officer stated that computer support at many of the 
maintenance centers is limited: When asked to submit a "wish list" to MSSG Supply 
with regards to required repair parts, one maintenance shop hand wrote the list, put it in 
an envelope, and mailed it to the MSSG! Although e-mail exists at most of the 
maintenance locations, many units are reluctant to use available computer technology. 
A second requirement is that the model be easy to manipulate from a PC screen. 
The Supply Officer envisioned calling a representative from each maintenance 
detachment into her shop, where she could have the model set up on her PC. The 
maintenance detachment would give recommendations regarding minimum and 
maximum quantities desired for certain NSNs, and recommendations for NSNs to be 
added or deleted from the master item list. 
While a volume constraint is something that the MSSG does not currently 
consider, the MSSG Supply Officer agreed that the model's capability to fill to a volume 
constraint would be useful. The model would give the MSSG the opportunity to 
experiment with different volume levels and different minimum and maximum stocks for 
certain NSNs. Additionally, if the space for the supply block were suddenly decreased, 
the model could be used to quickly modify stockage quantities. 
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2. MSSG Impressions of Model 
The MSSG Supply Officer was impressed with the ease of use of the model, and 
its ability to be easily adapted for minimum and maximum stock levels. It was difficult 
for her to analyze the model's recommended stockage levels or compare the model's . 
output to her own LVBF, because the model did not stock many of the items listed on the 
current MSSG-13 LVBF. The model's input data had been a CEC 5 and 6 GenPak 
created from the 13th MEV EDL. However, there were many items not included on the 
GenPak that the MSSG maintenance personnel had requested be stocked. As previously 
discussed, the GenPak does not have an association to an end item for many of the 
resident repair parts, so they are not listed as needing to be stocked. Also, the 
maintenance personnel request many items that are not CEC 5 and 6, yet are still critical 
repair parts to the end item. 
This is the biggest barrier to implementation of the model for creating the supply 
block. We are running the model using' the same poor data that the GenPak currently 
provides to the Supply Officer. The model can only stock the items that the GenPak 
includes, and we have already noted that those items are significantly lacking due to 
inaccurate CEC codes and faulty association data between parts and end items. 
Another reason for the differences in stockage levels was the model's input for 
demand at the time of the demonstration. We mistakenly used the recommended 
stockage levels given for each NSN by the GenPak, rather than multiplying that number 
by 1,488 to better represent demands per one million operating hours. We had not yet 
realized that this conversion was necessary for the proper running of the model. For this 
reason, the stockage levels recommended by the model were much lower than the results 
discussed earlier in the chapter and will most likely not perform as well as they would 
have with the revised demand figures. 
We attempted to change some of the initial stock levels (representing minimum 
stockage quantities) on certain items that we expected to have high MEV usage. 
However, the model results still looked significantly different than what the MEV had 
already decided to take. We cannot know how effective either the model or the MSSG's 
current supply block is until their deployment is completed. 
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F. SUMMARY 
1. Numerical Results of the Model Tests 
Figure 4 summarizes the results of the model tests. In every case, the block 
produced with an availability based model performed better than the supply block 
produced by the current system. This was despite the lack of user interaction with the 
model, which could improve the model's stockage quantities for items where MEU 
demand differs significantly from MEF demand: 
UNIT MODELB/O LUBFB/O % IMPROVEMENT 
26th MEU 52596 68416 23%* 
26th MEU (past MEU data) 63695 68416 7%* 
11th MEU 6992 15090 54%** 
11 th MEU (Laforteza's data) 1090 4730 77% 
*Understated due to suspected Incorrect usage data. 
* * Overstated due to an incomplete LUBF. 
Figure 4. Summary of Model Results 
The model results based on the past-MEU usage data did not perform as well as 
those based on the GenPak. However, we cannot make a conclusion regarding their 
relative utility in stocking the block because the past-MEU usage data limited the number 
ofNSNs considered by the model. It only included NSNs with usage quantities of four or 
greater, while the GenPak includes any NSN with greater than one hit in the MEF for an 
entire year. 
2. Problems Encountered With Input Data 
The data provided as the input to the model was significantly lacking in the areas 
of completeness and relevance. The GenPak provides the "master list" of NSNs to be 
considered for stockage in the supply block. However, that list is incomplete for two 
major reasons. The first is the inaccuracy of CEC codes. When a Supply Officer asks for 
CEC 5 and 6, he is looking for repair parts critical to the availability of an end item. 
According to supply and maintenance personnel, there are many parts that are not CEC 5 
and 6 that can render an end item inoperable, and they routinely include these items for 
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stocking in the supply block. The second problem is that of poor association data 
between end items and repair parts. There are repair parts that exist that have no . 
association to an end item. Therefore, the GenPak will not include the repair part when it 
produces a usage list for that 'end item. Once again, the experience of the supply and 
maintenance personnel is necessary to compile a complete list of parts to be considered 
for stockage. 
We found the complete MEU usage data difficult to compile. Although 
maintenance and supply records should match because the systems interface with one 
another, the results are significantly different. The 11th MEU usage data we received 
from the supply and maintenance systems attest to this fact. The two systems had a 
difference of 1,611 NSNs used for the deployment time. Another difficulty faced in 
. gathering MEU usage data is that the supply system does not maintain separate usage 
data for a MEU. The compilation of the three MEU components must be done by hand 
and then consolidated, and the data must be limited to the deployment time. In the case 
of the usage data we received for the 26th MEU, those compilations did not appear to be 
done accurately. 
Finally, the failure of the MSSGs to keep their initial deployment LUBFs made 
backtesting of the model difficult. The absence of an accurate LUBF for the 11 th MEU 
made the results of that test inconclusive, because we simply do not know how well the 
true 11th MEU LUBF would have performed. 
3. Using the Model in Practice 
We do not expect that this model will be used without any user interaction to 
build a parts block and send it on deployment. It has potential ~s a tool, to be used with 
the knowledge and expertise of the user, to build the most effective parts block within a 
given volume constraint. 
One possible shortcoming of the model is its reluctance to stock larger-sized 
items. A part may be critical to the repair of an end item, yet the model may avoid 
stocking it due to its volume. Additionally, any backorders associated with these larger 
items will have proportionally larger transportation costs because of their size and weight. 
We propose that the model would perform better if the user implemented it in the 
following way. First, the user runs the model with no user interaction as it was done for 
the tests in our work. Next, allow supply and maintenance personnel to examine the 
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model results, particularly looking at, the quantities recommended by the model for the 
larger items. The user may then change the minimum and maximum stock levels for 
these items (or any other items that the model is stocking in unacceptably high or low 
quantities), forcing the model to operate within the constraints given to it by the user. 
They would then run the model again, with the model then building a block using the 
remaining available volume (minus the volume of the minimum stock levels) and 
maximizing the items within that new volume. The user would continue with this cycle 
until a block is built that meets his requirements. This methodology allows the user to 
overcome the model's tendency to stock fewer large-volume items. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of the Marine Corps MEU(SOC) is to be ready to conduct any of its 29 
missions within a moment's notice. Readiness is the key to the MEU(SOC)'s success. 
We introduced the MEU(SOC) structure and the MSSG's mission to provide 
supply support to the other elements of the MEU. We discussed an availability based 
sparing model developed in a past work, showing its positive results in assisting the 
MSSG with the building of its supply block. However, we argued that the model had not 
been sufficiently tested, as its results were based on the data from only one MEU 
deployment. The requirement for more testing across several MEUs was necessary to 
prove or disprove the validity of the results. 
We also examined the current procedures for building the MSSG supply block 
(consumable repair parts) at units of I MEF, II MEF, and III MEF. The procedures 
themselves are not significantly different across the Marine Corps, but there are 
differences in the format and content of the GenPak, the primary report provided to 
Supply Officers in building their supply block. However, all Supply Officers we 
interviewed agreed that they used the GenPak very little and depended primarily on the 
experience of their maintenance detachment personnel for input regarding what items 
should be stocked for deployment. 
We discussed the idea of mission priority factors that could be assigned to end 
items and transferred down to their corresponding repair parts. We considered two types 
of priority factors, the first being a general priority across missions and the second 
prioritizing end items for each specific MEU(SOC) mission. While the first method is 
plausible, its implementation had very little effect on the model output. We did not 
implement the second method because we did not receive strong support for the idea in 
the interviews we conducted, and a look at the execution of some of the MEU(SOC) 
missions shows that a single mission can be executed in very different ways depending 
on outside factors. 
We introduced the data used to further validate the availability based sparing 
model, along with shortfalls in the data. The major shortfalls included the lack of 
retention of MSSG initial deployment stockage levels, the inaccuracy of CEC codes, the 
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inability of the supply system to associate all repair parts with an end item, and the 
inaccuracies in complete MEV usage data. Despite these data shortfalls, we showed the 
results of three tests of the model, with all of the model results performing better than the 
supply blocks taken with the MEUs. Running the model also proved to be much less 
time-consuming than current procedures, with a single run taking anywhere from fifteen 
minutes to six hours. A methodology for effectively using an availability based sparing 
model was proposed. Finally, the model was demonstrated for a unit preparing to deploy. 
The MSSG Supply Officer expressed interest in using the model, which would provide a 
quick way to explore alternative supply blocks and to revise volume constraints as 
necessary. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Usefulness of GenPak Data to MSSGs 
The usefulness of the 4ata contained in the GenPak could be greatly improved 
through the validation of CEC codes and better association of repair parts to specific end 
items. All interviews we conducted with MSSG Supply Officers showed. that the supply 
and maintenance personnel do not use the GenPak as a ·primary source of data when 
building their supply blocks because the items included on the GenPak are incomplete. 
Most of the parts and quantities are determined by the experience of the maintenance 
personnel. 
The GenPak data could be improved by taking into account the smaller number of 
MEV end items as compared to the number of MEF end items. The current data sources 
require consolidation of several different reports in order to obtain a percentage of MEV 
end items to the total MEF quantity. If supply and maintenance personnel have that ratio 
of MEV to MEF end item quantities, they can better calculate an accurate demand for 
parts associated with that particular end item. 
2. Effectiveness of the Model in Stocking the MSSG Supply Block 
Our results suggest that an availability based sparing model is an effective tool to 
help'the MSSG personnel. Without any user interaction, the model outperforined the 
current method building the supply block. Vser interaction could improve the model's 
performance for items with unusual high or low MEV usage as compared to that of the 
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MEF. The model is also a quick, easy tool for the Supply Officer to use in cases when 
the space available for the supply block changes. It allows for easy manipulation of ' 
minimum and maximum quantities, and the proposed methodology for its use can 
provide a way for the Suppiy Officer to compare several different possible block 
configurations prior to deployment. 
However, it should be noted that the quality of the model output is only as good 
as the input data. With the data available to us during this study, it did not perform as 
well as it may if the input data is improved. 
3. Use of Mission Priority Factors in Stocking the Supply Block 
We chose not to use mission priority factors in stocking the supply block. The 
. overall mission priority factors Laforteza gave to end items had no significant impact on 
his model results. The variability in missions, even missions of the same type, makes it 
difficult to give a type of end item a priority for a certain missi,on. Additionally, the 
ability of a MEU to know any detail about the type, location, and scope of missions it 
will conduct is limited. The purpose of the MEU is to be ready to conduct all missions, 
and it cannot afford to degrade that capability by planning for only a limited number of 
them. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Deployment Support Unit and MSSG Supply Officers should keep LUBFs 
from the beginning of deployments to facilitate further testing of models to improve the 
quality of the supply block, and for use by new Supply Officers in building their supply 
. blocks. 
2. A review of the CEC system should be conducted to validate the current CEC 
codes and improve the quality of GenPak data. 
3. A review of end items and their associated repair parts should be initiated that 
will eliminate repair parts that have no association to an end item. 
4. Continued efforts should be made create a GenPak that accounts for the 
percentage of MEU end items to the quantity throughout the entire MEF and adjusts 
recommended MEU stockage quantities based on that percentage. 
s. Complete MEU usage data should be kept by the Deployment Support Unit 
and SMU Operations Sections with a database that encompasses all units of the MEU 
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vice just the MSSG. Further research should be done when sufficient MEV data exists 
that compares the validity of past MEV data to that of MEF data when estimating demand 
for an outgoing MEU. 
6. A comprehensive effort should be made across the Marine Corps to resolve 
discrepancies between the usage data maintained by the supply system and that held by 
the maintenance system. These systems should be reconciled to provide a clear picture to 
the individuals needing to use this data. 
7. The proposed methodology for using an availability based sparing model 
should be implemented, with the model provided as a tool for the MSSG Supply Officer 
to use in building the supply blocks. 
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APPENDIX A. COMBAT ESSENTIALITY CODE 
CEC Definition 
1 Combat Essential End Item. End items of equipment whose availability 
in a combat ready condition is essential for execution of the combat and 
training mission of the command. 
2 Non-Critical Repair Part. Repair parts whose failure in the end item will 
not render it inoperative or reduce its effectiveness below the minimum 
acceptable level of efficiency, and which do not fit the definition of code 3 
or 4 items. 
3 Critical Item/Repair Part for Health and Safety of Personnel. Those items 
that are required for the health and safety of personnel, and which do not 
fit the definition of code 5 or 6 items. 
4 Critical Item/Repair Part for State and Local Laws. Those items that are 
required to conform with state and local laws, and which do not fit the 
definition of code 5 or 6 items. 
5 Critical Repair Part to a Combat Essential End Item. Repair parts whose 
failure in a combat essential end item will render .it inoperative or reduce 
its effectiveness below the minimum acceptable level of efficiency. 
6 Critical Repair Part to a Non-Combat Essential End Item. Repair parts 
whose failure in a non-combat essential end item will render it inoperative 
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· APPENDIX c. MEU(SOC) MISSIONS 
o AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT 
o AMPHIBIOUS RAID 
o AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION 
o AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL 
o IN-EXTREMIS HOSTAGE RECOVERY (IHR) 
o SEIZUREIRECOVERY OF OFFSHORE ENERGY FACILITIES 
o VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS (VBSS) 
o SPECIALIZED DEMOLITION OPERATIONS 
o TACTICAL RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL (TRAP) 
o SEIZUREIRECOVERY OF SELECTED PERSONNEL OR MATERIAL 
o COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
o PEACE OPERATIONS 
o SECURITY OPERATIONS 
o NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) 
o REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 
o JOINT/COMBINED TRAININGIINSTRUCTION TEAM 
o HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCEIDISASTER RELIEF 
o TACTICAL DECEPTION OPERATIONS 
o FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL IN A 
JOINT/COMBINED ENVIRONMENT 
o SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)IELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) 
o MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT) 
o RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (R&S) 
o INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE (ITG) 
o COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (CI) 
o AIRFIELDIPORT SEIZURE 
o LIMITED EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD OPERATIONS 
o SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS 
o JTF ENABLING OPERATIONS 
o SNIPING OPERATIONS 
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APPENDIX D. INPUT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VMETRIC MODEL 
INPUT REQUIRED 
Part Name 
Reference Number X 
Quantity Per Assembly (QPA) X 
Item Price X (unless using shadow price) 
MRR6 (Demands/million operating hours) X 
MTDs (Maintenance Task Dist'n, Site) 
MDTi (Maintenance Task Dist'n, Intermed) 
MDTd (Maintenance Task Dist'n, Depot) 
RCTs (Repair Cycle Time, Site) 
RCTi (Repair Cycle Time, Intermediate) 
RCTd (Repair Cycle Time, Depot) 
PL T (Procurement Lead Time) 
ADTP (Admin and Delay Lead Time) 
MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) Can be used instead of MRR6 
DC (Duty' Cycle) 
RIP (Repair in Place rate) 
NFF (No Fault Found Rate) 
ISs (Initial Stock, Site) 
lSi (Initial Stock, Intermediate) 
ISd (Initial Stock, Depot) . 
MAXS (Maximum Stock Level) 
MSs (Maximum Stock, Site) 
Msi (Maximum Stock, Intermediate) 







Item VMAX (Variance to Mean Ratio) 
Cannibalization Allowed (YIN) Defaults to Cannibalization Allowed 
PCCN (Provisioning Contract Control Number) 
PLISN (Provisioning Line Item Sequence Number) 
CAGE (Commercial and Government Entity Code) 
NSN (National Stock Number) 
SMR (Source, Maintainability and Recovery Code) X 
54 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ............................................................... .2 
8725 10hn 1. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library ........................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
3. Director, Training and Education ....................................................................... .1 
MCCDC, Code C46 
1019 Elliot Rd. . 
Quantico, VA 22134-5027 
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center ............................................................. 2 
MCCDC, Code C40RC 
2040 Broadway Street 
Quantico, VA 22134-5107 
5. Director, Studies and Analysis Division ............................................................. 1 
MCCDC, Code C45 
3300 Russell Road 
Quantico, VA 22134-5130 
6. Marine Corps Representative ............................................................................... 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Code 037, Bldg. 234, HA-220 
699 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93940 
7. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity ............................................... 1 
Technical Advisory Branch 
Attn: Maj 1. C. Cummiskey 
Box 555171 
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5080 
8. OIC, Sassy Management Unit.. ............................................................................. 1 
1 st Supply Battalion, 1 st FSSG 
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055 
55 
9. Ole. Intermediate Supply Support Activity ........................................................ 1 
2nd Supply Battalion. 2nd FSSG 
Camp Lejeune. NC 28540 
10. Captain M.R. Ercolano ........................................................................................ 1 
External Support Unit OIC 
3rd Supply Bn.3 rd FSSG 
Unit 38412 
FPO AP 96604-8412 
. 1 I. Captain Janet Keech ............................................................................................. 1 
2033 Barnett Ave .. Suite 3 I 5 
Quantico. VA 22134-5010 
12. G-3 SSE. Attn: Major Fullerton ........................................................................... 1 
2nd FSSG. U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic 
PSC Box 2002 
Camp Lejeune. NC 28542-0002 
13. Systems Exchange .... : .......................................................................................... 1 
Attn: Mr. Jon Redfield' 
P.O. Box 3290 
Monterey. CA 93942 
56 
